Is liberal intergovernmentalism regressive? A comment on Moravcsik (2018) by Hooghe, L. & Marks, G.
Is liberal intergovernmentalism regressive? A
comment on Moravcsik (2018)
Liesbet Hooghea,b and Gary Marksa,b
aDepartment of Political Science, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, NC,
USA; bCentre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Florence, Italy
ABSTRACT
This commentary discusses the evidential basis of postfunctionalism and liberal
intergovernmentalism and Moravcsik’s (2018) critique of postfunctionalism.
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Rarely has a theory been so closely associated with a single volume as the
theory of liberal intergovernmentalism is with Andrew Moravcsik’s The
Choice for Europe (CfE). Several contributions in this special issue and the
one published in the Journal of Common Market Studies (2018) question
liberal intergovernmentalism’s relevance in a politicized European Union by
comparison to postfunctionalism. In his 2018 article, Moravcsik defends
liberal intergovernmentalism and critiques postfunctionalism, referring exten-
sively to Hooghe and Marks (2009) and an earlier version of our article now
published in the Journal of European Public Policy.1 In this essay, we contrast
the evidence underpinning these theories, discuss AM’s critique of postfunc-
tionalism, and explain why inflating liberal intergovernmentalism is proble-
matic. For transparency, we detail sources and interpretations in an
extensive appendix on our websites.2
Our debate with Moravcsik engages three basic questions: What are the
causal underpinnings of international integration; how can one assess the val-
idity of alternative explanations; and what are the most constructive ways to
debate them.
On the first question, postfunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism
agree and disagree. They share the (neo)functionalist premise that institutio-
nalized cooperation among states is an effort to solve transnational problems.
However, postfunctionalism argues that this is countered by the desire for
self-rule on the part of those who conceive their national identity in conflict
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with the exercise of supranational authority. The corresponding puzzles that
postfunctionalism raises have to do with the sources of identity, the con-
ditions under which identity and functional pressures are mobilized politically,
and their effects on international governance.
These puzzles are directly relevant to the European Union, the context in
which regional integration has gone furthest and where we have not only
astute theory but diverse sources of information on politicization. However,
it makes little sense to confine a theory to European integration, and postfunc-
tionalism explicitly places the EU in the broader comparative context of multi-
level governance among and within states.
Postfunctionalism does not seek to point-predict particular outcomes. This
applies even to Brexit, a series of events in which postfunctionalism is reputed
to be prescient. However, we anticipated only the political tensions that could
lead to such an outcome. To predict Brexit one would need to predict not only
the result of the referendum, but also the complex bargaining that ensued,
the shifting responses of MPs, and Prime Minister Cameron’s decision to
hold the referendum in the first place. Point-prediction of such events requires
far greater knowledge than we have, and social scientists avoid the claim that
they can do so on grounds of pragmatic modesty. Postfunctionalism, like
other social science theories, seeks to uncover regularities under ceteris
paribus conditions.
This has implications for how one approaches the evidence. It is preferable
to assess a theory against a range of comparable cases, either in focused struc-
tured case studies or in quantitative analysis. The analyst can then frame gen-
eralizations and test them against a wide range of evidence under controls.
Assessing the power of a theory to predict individual events is less transparent
and more difficult to replicate.
Debate about the relative validity of contending theories is always
welcome, though to be honest, it is best conducted by those who are
removed from the genesis of the theories in question. Feynman (1985: 343)
once remarked that the first principle of science is that you ‘must not fool
yourself, and you are the easiest person to fool’. This is another reason why
one’s approach to the evidence is so vital.
Core claims and method
Postfunctionalism posits a tension between the functional benefits of multile-
vel governance and the desire for self-rule. Drawing on the comparative analy-
sis of public opinion, voting, and political parties, postfunctionalism theorizes
the incidence of exclusive identity at the individual level, the conditions under
which exclusive identity is politicized in competition among political parties,
and the resulting structure of political conflict. While postfunctionalism is
intended to come to grips with evolving EU politics, it is targeted at a
range of multilevel governance settings. The core expectation is that the re-
allocation of authority is constrained by the politicization of exclusive identity
in mass politics. This is conditional on the character and salience of an issue,
how it is connected to other issues, whether a decision enters mass politics,
and the ideologies of the actors who make key decisions.
Postfunctionalism makes claims about individual preferences, party com-
petition, and the structure of political conflict. It engages evidence from
case studies alongside cross-sectional and panel surveys of citizens, political
parties, social groups, and the media. The effort to test postfunctionalist
claims has also generated information that raises new puzzles by placing
the EU in a comparative frame. This includes data on decision making and
authority in 76 international organizations and on multilevel governance in
81 countries (Hooghe et al. 2016, 2017).3 These are intended to be used by
the scholarly community rather than to vindicate a particular theory. The data-
sets lay out their sources, assumptions, and indicators transparently before
the reader.
Both liberal intergovernmentalism and the evidence supporting it have
their definitive expression in the Choice for Europe (Moravcsik 1998) (CfE),
which remains one of the most cited sources for the study of European inte-
gration. Liberal intergovernmentalism theorizes European integration as a
process of inter-state bargaining in which governments are chiefly motivated
by economic preferences rather than by geopolitics or ideology. Bargaining
takes place in two arenas: domestic arenas where national preferences are
formed; and inter-state negotiation where governments determine jurisdic-
tional reform. Treaties are negotiated by ‘national leaders who consistently
[pursue] economic interests – primarily the commercial interests of powerful
economic producers and secondarily the macroeconomic preferences of
ruling governmental coalitions’ (CfE: 3).
In his 2018 article (1658), AM claims that ‘Few scholars or commentators
still contest LI’s ability to explain the past’. However, we follow Lieshout et
al. (2004) in finding that CfE biases the evidence to sustain an economic expla-
nation. The evidence in CfE takes the form of an extended narrative that
encompasses the bulk of the book. Narrative can be a valuable approach in
the social sciences but it comes with a particular challenge. Whereas systema-
tic case study and quantitative analysis are designed to allow observation to
check theory, a narrative that seeks to predict particular outcomes makes it
difficult to disentangle observation and theory. This potential pitfall has led
historians to place great weight on the accurate use of sources. To what
extent has an author accurately cited material? Does the author interpret
the sources plausibly or does he deploy them in line with his theory?
There is reason to believe that CfE is weak in each respect. When one reads
the sources marshalled to support the argument in CfE it becomes apparent
that they have been heavily interpreted to amplify economic factors,
including above all, agricultural interests. Profiles of key sources on our web-
sites reveal a pattern of bias in interpretation and bias of omission that goes
far beyond the subjectivity that could be considered normal in a narrative.4
Postfunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism differ sharply in their
accounts of the preferences of key political actors. This difference reflects con-
trasting approaches to evidence as well as contrasting ontologies.
Moravcsik’s critique of postfunctionalism
The evidence for AM’s interpretation of European integration appears uncon-
vincing for recent decades. Over the past twenty-five years European reform
has been politicized in twenty-two referendums, eleven of which have seen
governments go down in defeat. Debate over the EU has come to play a
major role in national elections, pitting mainstream political parties against
anti-EU challengers. If they wish to sustain support, governments need to
be intensely aware of public opinion over European issues. Europe and immi-
gration have combined to fuel a nationalist challenge to mainstream political
parties which have seen their share of the vote decline from an average of
72.5% in the late 1990s to 54.5% in 2018.5 The contest is two-sided. Previously
quiescent pro-EU citizens have begun to mobilize in large numbers. Green
and social-liberal parties in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and the Nether-
lands have seen their vote share increase, while Brexit generated mass pro-EU
demonstrations. The debate involves the kind of society in which we wish to
live. It is a debate about polity, not just policy. And there is mounting evidence
that it is restructuring political conflict across Europe.6
AM responds to postfunctionalism along two lines.7 First, he downplays
phenomena that are not subject to LI. Second, he inflates LI to encompass
them.
The main line of defense in JCMS (2018) is to say that popular opposition to
Europe has ‘little effect’ because ‘populists have rarely been successful in recent
general elections, referendums and European elections, and in exceptional cases
of success, they soon moderate general opposition to the EU’ (2018: 1663,
author’s italics). This ignores both the rise of populist nationalism and the
research it has generated. By 2018, populist nationalists received at least 10
percent of the vote in 15 of the 28 EU member states. Over the past ten
years they have entered, sustained, or brought down governments in
Austria, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and Slova-
kia. Where nationalists are considered non-coalitionable, as in Germany, their
rise has had the profound effect of constricting coalitions and government
alternation. At the same time, Europe and immigration have intensified div-
isions within mainstream political parties.
AM claims that nationalism is symbolism without substance. Like de
Gaulle’s geopolitics, populist nationalism elicits only ‘rhetorical lip-service’
from governments. It amounts to ‘organized hypocrisy’, a ‘kabuki theatre’
(2018: 1653, 1662–1663). And, in any case, ‘[t]he potential salience of
migration is not a recent development: majorities in nearly all OECD countries
have opposed migration for decades… ’ (2018: 1662).
We disagree with both statements. The political salience of immigration
has increased significantly over the past decade and, as postfunctionalism
theorizes, this has reinforced opposition to Europe. Radical TAN parties
have been pivotal in mobilizing a transnational cleavage arising from the per-
foration of national states by immigration, integration, and trade. This is a
phenomenon that can be probed systematically. The Chapel Hill Expert
Survey tracks the positioning of political parties on Europe and a range of
issues over the past two decades. This has allowed scholars, including us, to
investigate how political parties connect Europe to immigration across
countries and over time. CfE virtually ignores public opinion and party compe-
tition, and it has almost nothing to say about immigration.
Postfunctionalism theorizes the conditions under which national identity is
mobilized to shape jurisdictional reform. Brexit is an example of this in a high
barrier party system where a new cleavage produces severe party divisions
and high-voltage conflict. Postfunctionalism provides an explanation of the
sources of the conflict, the decision to hold a referendum, the psephology
of support and opposition, and the course of the debate in which Remainers
appealed to the functional benefits of integration and Leavers opposed
foreign rule and immigration. There is no return to the pre-Brexit status quo
even if the UK were to revoke Article 50 and remain in the EU. The EU
would accommodate a more intransigent, polarized, but diminished state
that would unload its ideological baggage in European debate. And the UK
itself has been deeply riven by Brexit. The cleavage over Europe has inten-
sified, and territorial tensions have increased.
Liberal intergovernmentalism downplays Brexit. In his recent article, AM
admits that ‘LI does not claim to offer an entirely satisfactory explanation
for Prime Minister David Cameron’s risky decision to call a referendum or its
surprising outcome’, and then blames British exceptionalism about which
‘[i]t is unclear whether LI, PF, HI or any other theory can say much else’
(1663). Having declared the choice of decision arena inexplicable, AM
claims that Brexit is merely symbolic politics.
LI sees only two viable options: to reverse course and renegotiate Britain’s pos-
ition within the EU, or to engage in ‘organized hypocrisy’, pulling out formally
and rhetorically, while pressing to retain substantive policies as close to the
status quo as possible… [E]ither way, functional policy changes little (1664).
This underpins the idea that politicization is epiphenomenal. Policy outcomes
are functionally determined if one believes that a political system will reba-
lance toward what its interests are.
In the new rendition of liberal intergovernmentalism, the theory is
stretched far beyond its former frame. To respond to the criticism that govern-
ment preferences depend on much more than the producer groups that were
the focus of CfE, AM asserts that this was never his intention. However, the
treatment of what CfE terms ‘nonproducers’ is simplistic. The political
influence of nonproducers is conceived to be a simple function of a country’s
per capita income and as limited to regulation of particular policies, such as
health and safety on the ground that this ‘explanation remains deliberately
simple, abstracting away from… . collective action, formal institutions, parti-
san competition, and issue linkage’ (CfE: 36, 40). Postfunctionalism suggests
that this leads in precisely the wrong direction if we are to understand the
forces bearing on European integration (2009: 23).
The JCMS article retreats from the core claim of CfE that commercial prefer-
ences explain the politics of European integration. It conceives LI as encom-
passing all rational influences on policy making ‘starting from the LI
premise that “the primary interest of governments is to maintain themselves
in office”’ (2018: 1652). However, to explain how governments maintain them-
selves in office requires that one analyze issue linkage, partisan competition,
public opinion, and elections – precisely the phenomena that CfE excludes on
grounds of simplicity.
AM wishes to contrast LI’s analysis of rational self-interest to the purport-
edly non-rational and irrational politics of postfunctionalism. However, the
forces theorized in postfunctionalism, including ideology, identity, and the
desire for self-rule, are no less rational or irrational than the pursuit of material
self-interest. Rationality refers to the relation between means and ends, not
the desirability of the ends. Postfunctionalism argues that political parties
are rational in responding to exogenous change but have sunk costs that con-
strain their flexibility. Postfunctionalism posits that identity as well as econ-
omic interest underlies preferences over European integration. ‘Identity is
causally important to the extent that an issue has (a) opaque economic impli-
cations and (b) transparent communal implications that are (c) debated in
public forums by (d) mass organizations rather than specialized interest
groups’ (2009: 13). Each of these conditions can be (dis)confirmed using
unbiased information. Unlike LI, we seek to explain the sources of public
support and opposition to Europe, and we find that economics is less
useful than theory drawn from comparative politics and psychology.
Beyond producer groups, LI is now conceived as covering all social groups.
‘Social groups often have an incentive to pressure governments to accommo-
date their interests’ and so ‘the most important determinant of international
cooperation is the pattern of potential transnational co-operation and compe-
tition among societal actors’ (2018: 1651 – our italics). AM concedes that LI
‘does not explain everything that goes on in an increasingly politicized and
contested Europe’, a concession that is modestly repeated a page later.
However, we are informed that LI ‘encompasses a far broader range of
phenomena than is often believed, including non-economic concerns, public
opinion, partisan politics, the role of smaller states, informal and evolutionary
processes and unintended consequences’ (1649, 1650 – our italics). These
inflated claims are regressive and weaken rather than strengthen the
theory. Artificially stretching LI widens the scope for ad hoc adjustment to
cover every contingency.
Notes
1. Our introductory article for this special issue lays out the contributions of post-
functionalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, and neofunctionalism in explaining
Europe’s four big crises: the Eurocrisis, the migration crisis, Brexit, and
illiberalism.
2. See https://garymarks.web.unc.edu/ and https://hooghe.web.unc.edu/.
3. These data are available at https://garymarks.web.unc.edu/data/international
authority/ and https://garymarks.web.unc.edu/data/regional-authority.
4. Profiles of key sources relating to de Gaulle’s European policy are available on
our websites.
5. Average vote share across the 14 largest EU member states in Western Europe
for national elections in 1999 (or most recent year prior) and 2018 (or most
recent year prior). Source: CHES data https://chesdata.eu.
6. The causes and effects of politicization are systematically analyzed and debated
by Stefano Bartolini, Tanja Börzel, Catherine De Vries, Pieter de Wilde, James
Dennison, Geoffrey Evans, Edgar Grande, Christoffer Green-Pedersen, Sara
Hobolt, Dominic Höglinger, Swen Hutter, Hanspeter Kriesi, Robert Rohrschnei-
der, Jan Rovny, Frank Schimmelfennig, James Tilley, Stephen Whitefield,
Michael Zürn, and in the contributions to this special issue.
7. The critique of postfunctionalism in the JCMS article is misleading at several
key points, two of which we note here. Postfunctionalism theorizes the
sources and consequences of the tension between exclusive national iden-
tity and functional pressures. It does not claim that Europe is ‘disintegrating
across the board’ (Moravcsik 2018: 1661, author’s italics). We reject the view
that jurisdictional outcomes are functionally efficient, and emphasize instead
an ‘agnostic detachment about whether the jurisdictions that humans
create are, or are not, efficient’ (2009: 2). JCMS (2018: 1660) tells us that
‘PF remains, in Hooghe and Marks’ words, “agnostic” about under what con-
ditions and in what direction concrete policy responds to pressure’ (2019).
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